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ABSTRACT
Governments increasingly regulate charities to restrict the number of organizations
claiming taxation exemptions, reduce charities’ ability to abuse state support, and
detect and deter fraud. Public interest theory arguments suggest that regulation
could increase philanthropy through enhancing public trust and confidence in
charities. Nevertheless, public choice theory argues that regulators seek to maximize
political returns, ‘manage’ charity-government relationships, and reduce potential
regulatory capture.
We analyse charity regulatory regimes using these two regulatory theories and
the relative costs and benefits of different regulatory regimes. Heeding these should
reduce regulatory inefficiency and balance accountability and transparency demands
against benefits charities receive from regulation.
KEYWORDS Charity accountability; regulatory theory; regulatory costs
In line with other segments of society, charities have become increasingly regulated
(Cordery, Sim, and van Zijl 2017). Nevertheless, in contrast to other sectors where
regulation trends towards homogeneity, Phillips and Smith (2014) note that charity
regulation is currently heterogeneous, especially as charities’ local foci reduce the
impetus for international harmonization. However, Phillips and Smith (2014) fore-
cast regulatory convergence, as regulators similarly seek charities to be accountable
and transparent. Harmonization is expected to lead to regulatory efficiency and
effectiveness, when regulators utilize common tools (reducing development costs)
and regulated charities experience lower compliance costs – especially when operat-
ing cross-jurisdictionally.
Government regulation may not always be ideal (Hepburn, n.d.). Hence, jurisdic-
tions operate co-regulatory and self-regulatory regimes (Phillips 2012; Bothwell
2001). Further, due to austerity, charity regulators receive fewer resources (Cordery,
Sim, and van Zijl 2017) and yet must still act in the public interest by seeking ‘the
protection and benefit of the public at large’ (Hantke-Domas 2003, 165). Regulators
therefore balance the need for effective regulation in the public interest along with
regulatory efficiency (Hepburn n.d.). For charities, regulation is efficient when its
costs do not exceed the benefits they enjoy. For the public, effective regulation will
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meet the public interest (i.e. protect and benefit them). Before expecting convergence
or harmonization, we must therefore analyse the regulatory environment and institu-
tional factors which inhibit both effectiveness and efficiency (Kling 1988; Hepburn
n.d.).
This research defines regulation (in line with Christensen and Lægreid 2006, 9) as
‘formulating authoritative sets of rules and setting up autonomous public agencies or
other mechanisms for monitoring, scrutinizing, and promoting compliance with
these rules . . . [to control] activities that are valued by a community.’ We compare
and contrast explicit aspects of charity regulation (particularly filing obligations and
the public availability of these filings), consider its different purposes and whether
regulators share regional similarities. This research extends a theoretical model of
regulation, applying it to charity regulators in eight jurisdictions and four geogra-
phically defined regions. The jurisdictions are the five chosen by Phillips (2013) with
the addition of three others to allow regional contextual comparisons and to ensure a
mix of old and new regulators. They are (1) two regulators operating new schemes in
Asia (China and Japan) and (2) the regulators from the two most regulated jurisdic-
tions in each of (a) Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), (b) North America
(Canada and United States), and (c) the United Kingdom (England and Wales, and
Scotland). Although Phillips and Smith (2014) suggest that charities’ regulatory
regimes are likely to coalesce, there is little understanding of why this may occur
and what, apart from assumed isomorphism, may cause it to happen. We argue that
the underlying regulatory drivers play a major role in shaping regulation and thus
seek to expose these within a theoretical model. This also allows us to highlight
regulatory actions which increase charities’ relative costs.
We first review arguments for regulation before developing our analytical model.
The differences and similarities between jurisdictions and regions are highlighted. In
concluding, we discuss the implications of the research and identify limitations of our
approach as well as opportunities for further research.
Charity regulation and theories to explain it
The rise in charity regulators is a function of the growing number and reach of third
sector organizations (TSOs) in general and charities in particular. For example, (a)
governments increasingly contract with charities to deliver social services (Cordery,
Sim, and van Zijl 2017; Mayer and Wilson 2010); (b) governments seek charities (and
other TSOs) to develop social capital within communities through, for example,
encouraging the arts and cultural diversity, and improving communities’ environ-
ments (Bryce 2005); and (c) citizens support charities through private and corporate
philanthropy; donating time, money and goods (James 1987). Recognizing potential
social good from charitable activity, governments provide state support, including
income tax exemptions (typically on surpluses from trading activities and income
from investments), reduced state and local taxes, and preferential access to govern-
ment funds (Abramson, Salamon, and Steurle 2006; Breen, Ford, and Morgan 2009;
Smith 2012). Governments often encourage philanthropy through providing taxation
concessions on applicable donations.1
Hence, governments regulate to limit fraudulent activity in charities (Phillips
2013) (as lower levels of trust would reduce philanthropy), to restrict potential
abuse of their support and to maintain the tax base (Frumkin 1998) (e.g. by ensuring
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charities operate in the public interest rather than for the pecuniary gain of their
members). Further, governments define ‘charity’ restrictively, limiting charities’ abil-
ity to advocate against public policy or to take other political action.
Regulation is deemed to be a ‘social good’ in the for-profit space where ‘[m]arket-
based regulatory instruments act to change or modify behaviour through the eco-
nomic incentives facing citizens and business’ (Hepburn n.d., 5). While charities
operate outside of the capital market, information asymmetries in the ‘market’ for
donations and contracts for services suggest that regulatory theory can be usefully
applied to charities (Cordery, Sim, and van Zijl 2017).
Six (2013) suggests responsive regulation theory (RRT) and self-determination
theory (SDT) as explanations for regulatory operations and compliance. RRT argues
that trust and control are substitutes and will drive a regulator’s enforcement style.
On the contrary, SDT considers that regulated individuals (and by inference, com-
panies) are motivated to comply with regulation when they are competent, engaged,
and align with regulators’ values (Six 2013). However, in this paper, we analyse the
underlying institutional arrangements that precede such compliance, rather than
regulatory practice. We use two theories driving the regulation and costs regulated
entities bear: public interest theory and public choice theory (Peltzman 1976;
Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Stigler 1971), as now discussed.
Public interest theory
The public interest theory of regulation asserts that regulation is necessary to protect
the public at large (Hantke-Domas 2003) and to deal effectively with substantive
resource distribution problems (Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Chalmers, Godfrey,
and Lynch 2012). Charity regulation recognizes a donor- and funder-market
(Cordery, Sim, and van Zijl 2017) which requires charities to practise good govern-
ance, accountability, and transparency (Mayer and Wilson 2010). Primarily charities
act to redistribute resources from donors and funders to beneficiaries in order to
repair market and government failures (Salamon 1987). Tax subsidies also redistri-
bute resources between activities as well as from, for example, rich to poor (Fleischer
2010). Public interest regulation would seek to ensure that charities do not facilitate
redistribution which contravenes the public interest.
Further, public interest theory argues that business operators prefer their private
interests and that information asymmetry demands regulation to protect the public
interest (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). Thus, charity regulators typically require
charities to report publically, in order to encourage donors’ trust and confidence
(Connolly and Hyndman 2013; Phillips and Smith 2014). In addition to according
benefits, regulation therefore imposes costs on the regulated, either in terms of more
(or more frequent) disclosures or through direct tariffs and taxes (Hepburn n.d.).
Information asymmetry is a core reason for governments to intervene in financial
accounting standard setting. For example, stock exchange regulators seek to restrict
corporate opportunities to manipulate reporting, assuming this will improve market
confidence and regulated entities’ governance (Solomons 1978). Nevertheless, despite
regulation, perceived failures in the market for accounting information have led to
calls for harmonization of accounting standards worldwide (Chalmers, Godfrey, and
Lynch 2012; Crawford et al. 2014). Hence, a charity regulator driven by public
interest theory will seek to build public trust and confidence by requiring charities
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to make public disclosures generally and financial disclosures specifically using
harmonized, legitimate financial reporting standards. Such public disclosure should
improve confidence in the donor- and funder-market (Cordery 2013; Cordery, Sim,
and van Zijl 2017; Sinclair, Northcott, and Hooper 2014). Nevertheless, charities bear
the cost of collecting and processing new information and obtaining assurance (Neely
2011).
Public interest theory specifically acknowledges market failure (Chalmers,
Godfrey, and Lynch 2012; Hantke-Domas 2003); hence, regulators work to reduce
the likelihood that a monopoly (or cartel) will under-provide or over-charge for a
good or service. To redress market failure, governments regulate to build (or support)
a market to efficiently establish prices and quality, as could happen for a donor- or
funder-market (Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Stigler 1971; Irvin 2005). This
includes entry restrictions. While charity cartels are less likely to occur, charity
regulators will carefully analyse applications from new charities, specifically to ensure
the charity meets the legal definition of a charity in that jurisdiction, including that
the applicant’s activities are in the public interest, they are not involved in substantive
lobbying/political activity and do not exist for the pecuniary gain of their members.
De-registering or punishing miscreants are also tools of public interest regulators.
Miscreants are located when, for example, a charity regulator monitors inappropriate
application of charitable funds (Breen 2009; Phillips 2013; Irvin 2005) or checks for
inappropriate amassing of tax-free assets by philanthropists (Frumkin 1998). Public
complaints and regulators’ investigations (Cordery, Sim, and van Zijl 2017) also
result in charity de-registration. Charities thus incur compliance costs to gain and
maintain their regulatory status, assuming that the regulatory framework beneficially
creates and supports the market within which they operate.
Christensen and Lægreid (2006) further argue (under public interest theory) that
the regulator should be specialized agency, autonomous from elected officials. This
isolates the regulator from political influence and is likely to enhance regulatory
effectiveness, despite possible coordination issues.
Public choice theory and regulatory capture
On the contrary, public choice theory (Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971) suggests that
rationally ignorant voters expect government to manage regulated entities (in this
case, charities). Government regulators also collect charities’ information to ensure
informed public policy, seeking charities to assist government in meeting its policy
outcomes. Yet, public choice theory finds that most regulation is a tool for addressing
merely perceived problems, leaving unrealized its promise of serving the public
interest; indeed, that sectional interests will drive regulation, rather than public
interest (Conybeare 1982; Kling 1988). Hence, the costs to the regulated party/ies
may be excessive in relation to the benefits they gain (Kling 1988).
Vague definitions and the broadness of the term ‘public interest’ further confirm
public choice theory (Hantke-Domas 2003), that is that politicians, regulators, and
the regulated will attempt to follow their own self-interest. Regulation may therefore
fluctuate in response to partisan political whims (Christensen and Lægreid 2006),
with rational regulators seeking to maximize political, rather than purely economic
returns (Peltzman 1976). Such fluctuations raise regulated parties’ costs. Further, few
incentives exist for such regulation to be efficient, due to indifference or rational
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ignorance from the taxpaying public and often complex bureaucratic structures in
regulatory bureaux (Conybeare 1982).
Extrapolating the public choice argument, charity regulation may be perceived as
‘good’ politically, especially when government financially supports charities (through
tax exemptions and contracting out). Nevertheless, applying Peltzman (1976) sug-
gests that regulatory bureaucrats pursuing their own interests will seek to increase
their power, escalate requirements for information from regulated charities, and
increase charities’ compliance costs without regard to public benefits. Irvin (2005)
cites state regulators hoping to boost their chances of re-election by boasting of the
number of convictions/miscreant charities. This is an example of Christensen and
Lægreid’s (2006) argument that regulation inside government can be less efficient and
driven by public choice.
Public choice also describes regulated parties’ lobbying that is detrimental to the
public interest (even when it seeks to reduce costly regulatory demands) (Kling 1988).
Extreme lobbying will lead to regulatory capture if the regulator aligns its actions
with the will of regulated parties (Stigler 1971). An example of avoiding regulatory
capture is the Australian Howard Government’s refusal to listen to what they termed
‘single-issue groups,’ ‘special interests,’ and ‘elites’ when they debated charity regula-
tion in the mid-1990s (Staples 2008, 271). Regulatory capture may mean current
participants in the market successfully lobby for barriers to entry that protect them
against others joining the ‘industry’ (Stigler 1971) or gains them higher remuneration
than others (as noted by Amirkhanyan 2010).2 Furthermore, this theory has been
cited as creating incentives for lobbying on proposed accounting procedures (Watts
and Zimmerman 1978), which is relevant to charities.3 Yet, public choice theory and
regulatory capture assume a coherent body of collective actors who will lobby
(Conybeare 1982) such as would occur in the charity sector when it organizes itself
through peak or umbrella bodies.4
Politicians also apply regulatory pressure when they impose personal or party
preferences on registration decisions and the cost or style of regulation (Posner 1974;
Barber 2012). An example from Simon (1995) is Congress’ significant changes to the
US Tax Reform Act 1969 which resulted in charitable gifts being diverted to charities
that were less-fully regulated (and even to some entities that were not charities) and
increased charities’ operational costs at the expense of charitable acts. Further, Irvin
(2005) explains that some US-based state regulators are revenue gathering, while
others do not charge at all. Hogg (2016) uses the UK example of austerity measures
diminishing the funds available to the Charity Commission in England and Wales
and concerns that this will threaten its continuance and autonomy.
A regulatory model to analyse charity regulation
‘Governments regulate charities in a variety of ways and through a variety of
government agencies’ (Mayer and Wilson 2010, 689). This structural decision is
informed by the theoretical motivation to regulate and by historical jurisdictional
structures (Irvine and Ryan 2013; Crawford et al. 2014) which drive costs and
benefits. Kling (1988) utilizes the institutional theory of regulation to analyse costs
and benefits arising under both public interest and public choice theories.5 Figure 1
adapts his model, utilizing two continua: costs/benefits and public interest/public
choice. The top half of Figure 1 depicts public interest theory (‘benefits likely to help
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public interest’) and below this public choice theory (‘costs likely to harm public
interest’). On the right-hand side, benefits and costs are revenue-enhancing for the
regulated party – in this case, charities – (‘benefits likely to help regulated party’) and
on the left are cost-augmenting to the regulated party (‘costs likely to harm regulated
party’) (Kling 1988).
Extrapolating this model to the charity sector and the above discussion, we assume
that charity regulation is beneficial for charities, by affording them legitimacy and
encouraging a donor- and funder-market. Hence, the theoretical reasons for charity
regulation that is beneficial to regulated charities and in the public interest (i.e. lying
in quadrant 1 in Figure 1) are summarized in the middle column of Table 1 and items
(a), (b), (f), and (g). (As shown in Table 1 by the arrow, the middle and right-hand
columns represent continuum extremes, with actual regulatory practise likely to vary
along the line.)
Partly as a response to scandals and partly to reflect regulatory ‘good practice,’
regulators now seek to use their powers and (where necessary) to call for regulatory
amendments to demand greater compliance, more transparency, and more information
on charities’ impact (Phillips and Smith 2014). These actions will increase information
demands on regulated charities and/or barriers to registration. Hence, barring an
improvement in technology (Kling 1988), charities will incur extra costs (e.g. Neely
2011) and may perceive that these costs outweigh regulatory benefits. Thus, regulation
moves to quadrant 2 – being cost-augmenting, but still in the public interest.6
How can a regulator ensure that even though regulation has moved to quadrant 2,
it remains in the public interest (does not fall to quadrant 4)? Hantke-Domas (2003)
suggests that recent public consultation enables the established regulator to ascertain
the public interest (especially when it uses a mix of different consultation methods,
Zhang 2010) (the extremes are described in (c) in Table 1). Further, in meeting their
statutory obligations to report on how they protect the public’s trust (Irvin 2005), a
number of regulators undertake ‘public trust and confidence surveys’ to monitor
public trust in charities (e.g. Horizon Research 2014; ChantLink 2013) (the extremes
are described in (e) in Table 1).7
Benefits likely to Help Public Interest
(Public Interest Theory)
Benefits
likely to
Help
Regulated
Party
Costs likely to Harm Public Interest
(Public Choice Theory)
Costs
likely to
Harm
Regulated
Party
Cost
augmenting
for
regulated
party
1
4 3
2
Revenue
enhancing
for
regulated
party
Figure 1. Adaptation of Kling’s (1988) regulatory benefit and harm.
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Quadrant 3 depicts regulation as revenue-enhancing for charities, but harmful to
the public interest (i.e. it has been derailed by public choice theory). This occurs
when the regulated party lobbies for benefits not in the public interest (the extremes
are described in (d) in Table 1). Such lobbying may occur through umbrella groups.
When the regulator capitulates to such lobbying, this is regulatory capture.
The final quadrant (quadrant 4) depicts cost-augmenting regulation that is also
driven by public choice. This results from a regulator’s politically driven decisions to
increase disclosure, further restrict access, or utilize other mechanisms that are cost-
augmenting to charities and harm (or do not help) the public interest (the extremes
are described in (h) in Table 1).
Comparing jurisdictions
This research analyses eight different jurisdictions in four different regions (as noted
in the introduction) to demonstrate regulatory factors and explain the model.
Relevant literature and documents were accessed to ascertain charity regulators’
similarities and differences. While the definition of a ‘charitable organization’ differs
in each of the jurisdictions examined, in broad terms such organizations must be
formed for public (not private) benefit, with their activities having to meet specifically
defined (charitable) purposes. In addition, they must not be involved in substantive
lobbying/political activity or exist for the pecuniary gain of their members. Table 2
summarizes regulators’ characteristics.
Discussion
The summary of eight countries’ regulatory regimes in Table 2 shows that charities
typically must register, file returns, and be monitored by the regulator on a random
basis (as presaged by Solomons 1978). Charities incur compliance costs, potentially
due to benefits they receive. Table 3 assesses each regulator in relation to the
extended Kling model (Figure 1 and Table 1) and this discussion first compares the
operation of public interest and public choice theories and relative costs, before
comparing the regional groupings.8
Charity regulators – public interest or public choice?
In respect of public interest items in Table 3(a), regulators in Japan, Australia, and
the United Kingdom are relatively autonomous in that while they are government
entities, they are independent (Japan and Australia) or non-ministerial departments
(United Kingdom). In contrast, New Zealand and the North American regulators are
situated in large, mature bureaucracies (government departments) and therefore will
theoretically prioritize process over the public interest (Conybeare 1982).
Only entities deemed to be charities will have their application to register approved
(an example of restricting entry to enable a donor- or funder-market). All charities
must register to receive tax exemptions (except the very smallest unincorporated
entities in England and Wales – see also Endnote 10). In most jurisdictions, row (f)
recognizes that non-small charities must file financial data and the regulator makes the
information freely available (except in China [due to the regulator’s newness], the
United States, and Canada). While the regulatory interactions are complex in each
8 C. CORDERY AND M. DEGUCHI
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jurisdiction, each has provisions to require de-registered charities to gift charitable
assets to another (similar) charity on closure and for taxation adjustments to be made
on income that is no longer exempt.
Nevertheless, (g) shows that inter-jurisdictional diversity exists in mandated
financial accounting standards. Indeed, the Japanese, United Kingdom and
United States regulators mandate specific formats for charity accounts prepara-
tion and presentation (being the PICAS,9 SORP, and Form 990, respectively).
Thus, individual benchmarks can be assessed (Japan) or calculated by others
(United Kingdom and United States), although such benchmarks are open to
manipulation (Hofmann and McSwain 2013). Financial statement preparation is
likely to increase charities’ costs if form filing is onerous and the accounting
standards are not widely known. While in the United Kingdom the SORP is
closely aligned to standards developed by the relevant local accounting standard
setter for for-profit entities, the Japanese PICAS is increasingly aligned with IFRS.
Nevertheless, PICAS differs from other TSO requirements and additional special
financial disclosures are mandatory (Deguchi 2016). The United States’ Form 990
has been criticized for not being aligned with Generally Accepted Accounting
Practice (GAAP) due to its specific disclosures (Keating and Frumkin 2003). In
all other cases (China, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada), charities use stan-
dards developed by the relevant local accounting standard setter. In New Zealand,
these are similar to the standards developed for the public sector (and based on
international standards, although they are new) and in Canada the charity’s
origin decides whether for-profit-based or public-sector-based standards are to
be used. In Australia and China (similar to the United Kingdom), charities use
standards developed for the for-profit sectors; but dissimilar to the United
Kingdom, these have few amendments for charity-specific reporting. Such report-
ing is a new requirement in Australia.
For continued registration, Canada and Japan require charities to meet specific
expenditure benchmarks, while in England and Wales and the United States,
Table 3. Summary of assessment of charity regulators’ actions against factors.
Factors considered Help the public interest Harm the public interest
(a) Institutional form of
regulator
Japan, Australia, England and Wales,
Scotland
China, New Zealand, Canada,
United States
(b) Must charities register to
obtain tax exemptions?
China, Japan, New Zealand, England and
Wales, Scotland, Canada
Australia, United States
(c) Year of most recent
consultation
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, England
and Wales, Scotland, Canada
China, United States
(d) Extent of lobbying since
most recent Act
China, New Zealand, United States Japan, Australia, England and
Wales, Scotland, Canada
(e) Trust and confidence
survey?
Australia, New Zealand, Scotland China, Japan, England and
Wales, Canada, United
States
(f) Must charities file regularly?
(Is it publicly available?)
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, England
and Wales, Scotland
(Also costs to filer)
China, Canada, United States
(g) Type of accounting
standards required to be
followed?
China, Australia, England and Wales,
Scotland, Canada
(Also costs to filer)
Japan, New Zealand (new),
Canada, and United States
(h) Is extra information required
to be filed?
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, England
and Wales, Scotland, United States
(Also costs to filer) China,
Canada
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fundraising expenditure and income is itemized, allowing extrapolation to bench-
marks by interested donors or their agents (Breen 2012). New Zealand and Australia
do not require this benchmarking, although each Australian state regulates fundrais-
ing separately.
Other indicators of regulation in the public interest are recent consultations and
maintaining the public’s trust in regulated entities (row (c) in Table 3). The United
States and China are the only two jurisdictions where public consultations have not
been undertaken in the last 10 years. For the former, this may be related to its
maturity as a regulator, while the latter operates a socialist republic, resulting in less
consultation than in a democracy.
Neither Japan nor China has stated a specific objective to increase public trust and
confidence. For the United States and Canada, the operation of an active rating
agency may substitute for the regulator’s work. While a survey in England and Wales
showed falling public trust and confidence as a reaction to recent scandals (Populus
2016), surveys in the other three countries show public trust and confidence being
maintained (ChantLink 2013; Horizon Research 2014; Office of the Scottish Charity
Regulator 2016). Thus, four out of the eight regulators are required to contribute to
the maintenance of public trust and confidence, and recent surveys suggest that the
regulator in England and Wales is struggling in this respect. We are unable to assess
the remaining four.
Table 3 shows that fewer aspects of jurisdictions’ regulations follow public choice
theory propositions. Yet, we observe lobbying leading to regulatory capture and
regulators requiring disclosures which are not made publically available (row (d)).
In Canada and Japan, strong sector lobbying has effected regulatory change and, thus,
may indicate regulatory capture which the regulators guard against. Some charities
are exempted from filing in Australia, England and Wales, and the United States.10 In
England and Wales and the United States, this relates to decisions made some time
ago which are unlikely to be changed, but there is less evidence of recent regulatory
capture (except for Simon 1995 in the United States). Nevertheless, strong lobbying
by Australia’s religious entities almost led to the demise of the ACNC (Phillips and
Smith 2014). This provides an example of public choice theory’s warnings against
regulatory capture. China’s regulator is too new to publish charity data, and it is too
early to tell if it will be made available. Charity data are not freely available in North
America.
How do these arrangements reflect costs and benefits for the regulated charities?
Quadrant 1 and 3 of Figure 1 include revenue-enhancing benefits. While all regulated
charities bear compliance costs, these are relatively low in England and Wales,
Scotland, Canada, and, to some extent, the United States (the Form 990 is not aligned
with GAAP but has been relatively unchanged for a number of years).11 Of more
concern are the mandatory requirements for charities to complete specific calcula-
tions on filing, and where no allowance is made for smaller charities, as occurs in
Japan and China. Such requirements are cost-augmenting for charities (i.e. place
them in quadrant 2 or 4). In Australia and New Zealand, where charities must report
using new accounting methods, the expense of converting may be cost-augmenting;
yet, the requirements could be in the public interest. Mitigating these costs is the
public availability of these disclosures and enhanced transparency. The newer reg-
ulator in Australia is working hard to gain legitimacy with its constituents despite the
exemptions it has been forced to make on religious entities’ filings.
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Charity regulators – regional groupings?
This analysis is based on Phillips and Smith’s (2014) assumption that regional
similarities exist.
Asia
In both jurisdictions, the filings/registration is complex, engendering high compli-
ance costs. These reactive processes seek to reduce the likelihood of regulatory
capture. China’s new charity law is effective from 2017. The regulator is within a
government department and has not stated explicitly that it seeks to increase public
trust and confidence or whether it will focus only on registration and monitoring.
The government emphasizes national security and a ‘societal public interest’ that the
government interprets on a discretionary basis (Yu 2017). The new regulation is
likely to be driven by public choice (towards quadrant 4). If the regulator transpar-
ently publishes charity filings (as it is required to do under Article 69), it could move
into quadrant 2.12 Japan’s compliance costs (particularly the financial data
demanded) are high, but the regulator is an independent government entity (making
it less likely to be subject to the whim of political manipulation) and charity data are
publicly available. Hence, we suggest it could be in quadrant 2 of Figure 1. These two
jurisdictions share regional similarities, especially as Chinese delegations often visited
Japan to discuss Japan’s PIC system prior to passing its legislation. Indeed, China
Charity law adopted the same Chinese character of Rending (authorization) as the
legal term of nintei of the Japanese law (Z. Yu, personal Communication, 13 March
2017).
Oceania
Australia and New Zealand are more likely to be in quadrant 1 or 2 of Figure 1. The
newness of the ACNC means charities currently bear higher compliance costs due to
new disclosure requirements, which the ACNC believes to be in the public interest.
Being an independent government entity and therefore an autonomous regulator, the
ACNC is engaging with the public. Further, no longer facing closure, it is working to
reduce charities’ compliance costs by eliminating differences in relevant state regula-
tions. Nevertheless, the exemption from filing for religious entities, which resulted
from strong lobbying, risks the ACNC risks falling below the public interest line. New
Zealand’s CS is within a government department, and new accounting requirements
are mandated from the 2015–2016 financial year. While attempts were made to
consult as fully as possible on these standards, charities currently face high compli-
ance costs. New Zealand is likely to move into quadrant 1, but this depends on the
regulator’s actions and sanctions, and how its recent move into a government
department changes its regulatory approach (as Christensen and Lægreid 2006
suggest that being inside government will make it less efficient). Both New Zealand
and Australia have received similar trust and confidence scores from public surveys.
North America
Canada and the United States share similarities, in that public trust and confidence is
not their prime motivation, the regulator is the taxation department, and they are
both mature regulators. Canada’s co-regulation and the actions of Imagine Canada
and other umbrella groups may lead to regulatory capture and place it in quadrant 3
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or 4. The United States has a similar position, as its filing requirements are not
aligned with GAAP, resulting in un-standardized and unreliable reporting (Hofmann
and McSwain 2013). Both cases require evidence of an absence of bureaucratic
inefficiency and focus on process if these regulators are to move into public interest
quadrants 1 or 4.
United Kingdom
England and Wales and Scotland are similarly strong when measured against public
interest theory. They are both non-ministerial government departments. While
CCEW’s underlying legislation (Charities Act 2011) exempts and excepts certain
groups (see Endnote 10), these are historical matters for this mature regulator.
However, the concern for adequate resourcing is current (Hogg 2016), as is the
drop in public trust and confidence in regulated charities (Populus 2016). The
regulatory choices made in the establishment of OSCR (as a relatively new regulator
under the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005) recognize the
necessity not to exempt entities and also the need for the regulator to be appro-
priately resourced. This places it strongly in quadrant 1 of Figure 1.
There are limitations to this research. As with any theoretical model, the aggrega-
tion of data into eight categories generalizes information and reduces the context-
specific nuances evident in individual jurisdictions. Further, in analysing regulation,
we have considered only the main charity regulator, rather than the many other
regulations that charities face, such as health and safety, or accreditations that
charities may obtain for their programmes (as seen in e.g. Bedford 2015).
Nevertheless, with charity regulators on the rise, there is merit in considering
whether this type of regulation is in the public interest and what the costs might
be. Despite different definitions of charities worldwide, this research has considered
the entities that are most similar in gaining taxation exemptions and being regulated
for their public benefit work. Further extending the arguments of Six (2013) to
analyse regulatory compliance would be useful.
Conclusion
Charity regulation informed by public interest theory leads to mandatory financial
reports to reduce information asymmetry and increase public trust and confidence in
charities (Neely 2011; Sinclair, Northcott, and Hooper 2014; Cordery, Sim, and van
Zijl 2017). Further, governments regulate charities in order to monitor charities
receiving tax exemptions (Phillips 2013; Abramson, Salamon, and Steurle 2006;
Breen, Ford, and Morgan 2009), and which they depend on to deliver social services
(Hofmann and McSwain 2013). Hence, charity regulators respond to fraud and
public scandals by using their powers (and where necessary calling for amended
regulation) to increase their scrutiny of charities, including mandating regular
reporting as one condition that will allow a charity to continue to enjoy taxation
concessions and other benefits (Mayer and Wilson 2010; Frumkin 1998). However,
charity regulators also face barriers, including constrained resources which limit their
enforcement activities and require them to constantly seek efficiencies (Mayer and
Wilson 2010; Hogg 2016). Designing appropriate regulatory requirements that are in
the public interest is challenging (Hepburn, n.d.; Christensen and Lægreid 2006), and
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evidence from these eight countries suggests that where trust and confidence is
measured, it is static, rather than rising (e.g. Horizon Research 2014; ChantLink
2013). Potential donors may not be aware of the charity regulator, although they
believe that regulation is ‘good’ (Hogg 2016). Analysis of regulatory institutions and
trust and confidence is needed to understand if regulatory tools are effective, both in
the present and in the longer term.
The model developed in this research allows us to assess the relative costs of
regulation on charities. In some jurisdictions, new disclosure regimes impose higher
compliance costs than charities have previously borne (e.g. Australia, New Zealand,
Japan, China). Over time, charities become familiar with the new requirements and
these costs should diminish if the regime is otherwise efficient; hence, charities will
enjoy net benefits as donors’ trust and confidence rises (as can be seen with investors
in the stock market in Solomons 1978).
Yet, public choice theory also motivates charity regulation, as evidenced by the
impact of lobbying and changes to legislation on politicians’ whims (see examples
from the United States [Simon 1995] and Australia [Phillips and Smith 2014]).
Lobbying and political influence create regulatory inefficiency and harm public
interest (Conybeare 1982; Kling 1988; Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Peltzman
1976; Irvin 2005; Posner 1974). Regulators should consider how best to publicly
communicate regulatory quality and the comparative options, in order to continue to
ensure that charity compliance costs are maintained at reasonable levels and that
such regulation is in the public interest (nearer quadrant 1 of Figure 1). The charity
sector also has a role, as can be seen, for example, in Canada, where it strongly
influences and is involved in co-regulation (Phillips 2012), but the regulator must
guard against regulatory capture (Stigler 1971). Further analyses of the benefits of
charity registration and the costs of compliance with these regimes are required.
The theoretical model developed and the case studies allow us to analyse differ-
ences between eight charity regulators. Phillips and Smith (2014) suggest that con-
vergence is a likely outcome of similar concerns for efficiency and effectiveness and
confirm that charity regulators meet regularly to discuss matters of interest.
Nevertheless, we show that the theoretical drivers for regulating locally, as well as
lobbying and institutional arrangements, remain a barrier to international conver-
gence. This diversity suggests that regulators may not always seek to replicate tools
that others use to achieve regulatory efficiency and to reduce charities’ compliance
costs. Yet, the model also shows regional regulatory similarities, suggesting scope for
increased regional harmonization. Further, the case studies also provide a useful
reference for charities and others interested in cross-jurisdictional work.
Notes
1. For example, income tax exemptions exist for qualifying entities and activities in each of the
jurisdictions studied in this research. Other tax benefits, some of which are quite complex,
are also available. For example, exemption from Fringe Benefit Tax (Australia); limited
concessions on Goods and Services Tax/Value Added Tax/Sales Tax (Australia, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States); and limited concessions on land/property tax (in
each jurisdiction except China). Furthermore, in each of the jurisdictions studied, there are
taxation incentives for qualifying charitable donations (either in the hands of the donor and/
or the charity). By assessing, on a scale of 1–5, the extent to which the tax system supports
making and receiving charitable donations locally and cross-border, the Index of
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Philanthropic Freedom (Hudson Institute 2015) allows a comparison of the relative benefits
to donors. Using this Index, the United States scores 5.0, Canada 4.7, Japan and NZ 4.5,
Australia and the United Kingdom 4.0, and China 2.4.
2. While barriers to entry also exist in public interest theory, they protect against market
failures, rather than, as in public choice theory, barriers lobbied for by regulated entities or
by politicians.
3. Public choice theory also sees the regulators asking government to fix prices or to restrict
complements or substitutes (Kling 1988; Stigler 1971), but these actions do not appear to be
relevant to charities.
4. However, when the regulatory issue is a specific one, it may need only a group of entities in a
specific sector or region to be active enough to impact the final shape of the regulation.
5. Keating and Frumkin (2003, 5) note that ‘costs and benefits are unobservable and difficult to
quantify;’ however, a regulator must estimate these in designing appropriate regulation.
6. For example, Irvin (2005) estimates charities spend between 10 and 24 h a year on gathering
and reporting extra information to their state regulator (depending on the charity’s size) but
she did not ascertain what benefits they gained.
7. We recognize that not all regulators have as a prime motivation the increase of public trust
and confidence and therefore such a survey may not be considered.
8. As noted below, generalizations are required in order to do this and some of the nuances of
regulation and regulatory activity are therefore lost. However, as with prior research, we took
the regulation that affects larger charities and compared the findings in Table 2 against the
theoretical model.
9. A new PICAS (Public Interest Corporation Accounting Standard) was issued by PICC in
2008. Public Interest Corporations must submit ‘forms’ based on financial reports prepared
under PICAS.
10. In Australia and the United States, religious entities are required to register but not file
financial statements/financial returns. In England and Wales, the Charities Act (2011) seeks
to ensure that all charities will have a principal regulator and therefore the government is
progressively reducing the exceptions previously granted to, for example, many places of
worship, Scout and Guide groups and armed forces charities (i.e. excepted charities). These
must now register with the CCEW if their income is more than £100,000 per annum
(Morgan 2017). Excepted charities must, however, complete financial accounts in line with
the Charities Act (now 2011) and have them independently examined if their revenue is
greater than £25,000 (Morgan 2009).
11. While the actual time required to comply may be significant, the financial accounting require-
ments in these jurisdictions recognize size-driven capacity constraints are aligned with nation-
ally recognized GAAP (except for the US as noted) and have been stable for some time.
12. However, there is concern about the vague stipulation and ambivalent attitudes to China
charity law (“The Good – and Bad – About China’s Charity Law” 2016).
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